Description
The assignment is to write a critical review of the below paper that is Proximity Based IoT Device Authentication. Please make sure there should be no plagiarism. Please follow the guidelines attached below.Paper Review Should be written from the writer’s point of view that is from our point of view. Do not write the paper review as a summary of the research study.Proximity Based IoT Device Authentication
Jiansong Zhang1† , Zeyu Wang2† , Zhice Yang2 , and Qian Zhang2
Microsoft Research1
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology2
jiazhang@microsoft.com1 , {zwangas, zyangab, qianzh}@cse.ust.hk2
Co-primary Authors†
Abstract—Internet of Things (IoT) devices are largely embedded devices which lack a sophisticated user interface, e.g., touch
screen, keyboard, etc. As a consequence, traditional Pre-Shared
Key (PSK) based authentication for mobile devices becomes
difficult to apply. For example, according to our study on home
automation devices which leverage smartphone for PSK input,
the current process does not protect against active impersonating
attack and also leaks the Wi-Fi password to eavesdroppers, i.e.,
currently these IoT devices can be exploited to enter into critical
infrastructures, e.g., home networks. Motivated by this realworld security vulnerability, in this paper we propose a novel
proximity-based mechanism for IoT device authentication, called
Move2Auth, for the purpose of enhancing IoT device security. In
Move2Auth, we require user to hold smartphone and perform one
of two hand-gestures (moving towards and away, and rotating)
in front of IoT device. By combining (1) large RSS-variation and
(2) matching between RSS-trace and smartphone sensor-trace,
Move2Auth can reliably detect proximity and authenticate IoT
device accordingly. Based on our implementation on Samsung
Galaxy smartphone and commodity Wi-Fi adapter, we prove
Move2Auth can protect against powerful active attack, i.e., the
false-positive rate is consistently lower than 0.5%.
I. I NTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) has quickly moved from hype
to reality. Gartner estimates that the number of deployed
IoT devices will reach 20.8 Billion in 2020 [1]. Like other
disruptive technologies, such as smartphones and cloud computing, IoT holds the potential for societal scale impact by
transforming many industries as well as our daily lives.
However, IoT also brings security challenges due to its large
scale and embedded device nature [2]. In this paper we discuss
security of a basic IoT device function, i.e., associating to
Internet gateway (e.g., Wi-Fi access point). In particular, we
found authenticating an IoT device is non-trivial, and existing
design actually leads to security vulnerability in practice. For
example, according to our experimental study on a popular
home automation brand, we can obtain the secrets that are
sufficient for stealing home Wi-Fi password from all (million
of) the devices based on our attack on one device. From further
discussion on this real world example, we show the need for a
carefully designed IoT device authentication mechanism. We
will elaborate the experiments and discussion in section II-A.
In Figure 1, we take home automation scenario as an
example to describe IoT device authentication. Home Wi-Fi
router needs to authenticate home automation devices (e.g.,
smart power switch) before allowing them to connect. On the
mean time, a nearby attacker (e.g., deployed attacking device
around home) can perform (1) passive attack by sniffing all
Home Wi-Fi router
(c)
(a)
eavesdropping
impersonating
(b)
Home Automation Device
Attacker
Smartphone
Fig. 1. We take home automation device as an example to illustrate the IoT
device authentication problem. (a) Home Wi-Fi router needs to authenticate
the device before connecting. (b) Smartphone is leveraged to input Wi-Fi
password. (c) An attacker can eavesdrop by sniffering Wi-Fi channel, or
impersonate the IoT device to connect to router/smartphone.
message exchanges on Wi-Fi channel, or (2) active attack by
impersonating the home automation device and connecting to
home router. Therefore, a successful attack may obtain sensitive information (e.g., home Wi-Fi password as we observed
in section II-A), or get the access to home network which
enables further attack.
From Wi-Fi router point of view, an IoT device is all the
same as a mobile device (e.g., smartphone or tablet), on which
Pre-Shared Key (PSK) is widely used for device authenticate.
Specifically, 802.11 standards incorporate a Diffie-Hellman
key exchange based mechanism, called Simultaneously Authentication of Equals (SAE) [3], for mutual authentication
between router and device. SAE plus a limited number of
retries provides solution against the attacks shown in Figure 1.
However, from device point of view, IoT brings new challenge
because the devices usually lack means for PSK (e.g., Wi-Fi
password) input, as they are mostly embedded devices. Specifically, in this paper we assume the IoT device (1) does not
contain sophisticated user interface like screen or keyboard, (2)
does not equip sensors like camera, accelerometer, gyroscope,
NFC, microphone, etc. (3) is not easy to move (e.g., power
switch plugged on walls).
Many IoT device vendors leverage smartphone to input
PSK. As shown in Figure 1(b), they connect IoT device
to smartphone first. As long as the connection between smartphone and IoT device is secure, IoT device can obtain
PSK from smartphone and perform PSK based authentication
with router as mentioned above. In this way, the problem
is reduced from router-IoT authentication to smartphone-IoT
authentication. In this paper, we also take this solution and
focus our study on IoT-to-smartphone authentication.
In literatures, there are a set of mobile/wearable device-
(a) Move towards and away
(b) Rotate
Encrypted
message exchanges
Sensor trace
Vs.
RSSI trace
Fig. 2. Proximity based IoT device authentication. User holds smartphone
and performs small gestures (a. move towards and away, b. rotate) in front
of IoT device while IoT device is transmitting. Smartphone compares sensor
trace with rssi trace to determine whether the device is in proximity.
pairing solutions [4]–[9]. We notice that those solutions are not
prefered in our problem because of IoT devices’ constraints
mentioned above (three assumptions). For example, moving
both devices together [4] or along predefined path [5] will
not apply because IoT device does not equip accelerometer/gyroscope and does not move. We will discuss related
authentication problems and solutions in details in section II-B
to further explain why our problem calls for new design.
In this paper, we propose a proximity based mechanism for
smartphone to authenticate IoT devices, called Move2Auth.
As shown in Figure 2, we require user to hold smartphone
and perform one of two hand gestures (randomly picked by
smartphone) in front of the IoT device, while on the mean time
the IoT device is keep sending packets. The two gestures, i.e.,
moving smartphone towards and away from IoT device, and
rotating smartphone, both lead to significant (around 15dB)
variation in Received Signal Strength (RSS) because of fastchanging attenuation and antenna polarization, respectively. In
Move2Auth, we combine (1) large RSS-variation detection,
and (2) matching between RSS-trace and smartphone’s sensortrace, to perform reliable proximity detection, where (1) can
effectively differentiate devices in-proximity and far-away,
and (2) can protect against powerful active attacker who can
arbitrarily tune transmission power.
We implement Move2Auth on Samsung Galaxy smartphone
and commodity Wi-Fi adapter. We invite 5 users to test our
prototype and conduct experiments on a test-bed containing
12 IoT device locations. The evaluation results show that (1)
Move2Auth is reliable in differentiating sender-in-proximity
and sender-far-away. (2) Move2Auth is reliable against active
attacker who can tune transmission power or even has user’s
historical gesture traces. The false-positive rate in proximity
detection is consistently lower than 0.5%.
In this paper, we make two major contributions.
We take experiments to study the security of IoT device
association and find (unreported) vulnerability on popular
home automation brand. This study motivates the design
of IoT-specific device authentication mechanism.
• We design, implement and evaluate Move2Auth which
provides a reliable IoT device authentication mechanism.
•
II. M OTIVATION AND R ELATED W ORK
In this section, we present our experimental study on
IoT device association, during which we observe unreported
security vulnerability from a popular (millions of devices)
home automation brand. We analyze this case and argue that
an IoT-specific device-authentication mechanism is needed.
Based on detailed discussion of related authentication problems and solutions, we motivate the design of a new mechanism which we propose in this paper.
A. Vulnerability in IoT Device Association
Recently, IoT has raised many security concerns and also
attracted a lot of research interests [2], [10]. In this paper,
our study on device association is motivated by several recent reports that home automation devices may leak Wi-Fi
password while associating to home Wi-Fi router [11], [12].
Specifically, during the process shown in Figure 1, password
leakage happens while smartphone is sending password to the
device, because the transmission is all in plain text.
While the case appears like an implementation issue, we
further take our own experiments and find that the issue is
actually non-trivial to fix. We tried a popular home automation
brand Belkin Wemo which provides a rich set of products,
such as smart power switch, motion detector, camera, lighting
LED, etc. [13]. Wemo’s association process is also the same
as in Figure 1. When we capture the message exchanges
between smartphone and Wemo devices, we found Wemo did
add protection for the password leakage issue by encrypting
the password. Figure 3(a) shows an example of encrypted WiFi password which was captured by wireshark. Deriving from
the format, the password is encoded using Base64 [14] (after
some encryption algorithm).
However, the encryption is not sufficient to protect password. Since Wemo devices can decrypt the password, Wemo
devices must have carried all the secrets for decryption (e.g.,
key, initial vector, salt, encryption algorithm, etc.). Therefore,
we read out Wemo firmware and took binary analysis to
retrieve the secrets. Figure 3(b) show the flywires we made
between the SPI flash chip on Wemo logic board (Various
Wemo devices contain the identical logic board) and a USB
flash reader ($10). After obtaining Wemo firmware from the
flash memory, we perform binary analysis as follows. First,
with simple string analysis, we can learn that wemo firmware
is built on top of the popular embedded operating system
OpenWRT. Then, we use firmware analysis tool (e.g., binwalk [15]) to recover the entire file system as well as individual
program binaries. After manually locating the related programs
(mostly by program names), we finally leverage disassembler
tool (e.g., IDA [16]) to convert program binaries to assembly
codes and retrieve the secrets from the codes. As we expected,
the encryption algorithm calls openssl libaries [17] and takes
a combination of device ID and MAC address as key, initial
vector and salt.
More importantly, we have actually obtained the secrets for
decrypting all (millions of) the Wemo devices! Because Wemo
do not carry any device specific secret (e.g., a secret code in the
firmware of each Wemo device) except device ID and MAC
address, and device ID and MAC address must be sent from
Wemo device to smartphone before password encryption, as
we have captured in Figure 3(a).
MAC Address & Device ID
Wemo logic board
Encrypted Wi-Fi password
(a) Captured message exchanges
SPI flash reader
(b) Read out firmware binary
Fig. 3. Our experiment retrieved the secrets which can be used to decrypt
home Wi-Fi password from all (millions of) Wemo devices. (a) Captured
message exchanges between smartphone and Wemo device. First, Wemo
device sends device ID and MAC address to smartphone (up message).
Then, smartphone sends encrypted Wi-Fi password to Wemo device (bottom
message). (b) We made flywires between the SPI flash chip on Wemo logic
board and a USB flash reader ($10). We then use this tool to obtain Wemo
firmware binary and perform binary analysis to retrieve the secrets.
To conclude our experiments, the protection implemented
by device vendor (i.e., Wemo designer) is indeed not sufficient
to fix the password leakage issue. In the following, we discuss
this defeated solution as well as other two possible solutions.
We will show that carefully-designed device authentication
mechanism is a must for secure device association.
1) Defeated Vendor Solution: Encrypting Wi-Fi password
actually provides a low cost solution for device authentication,
i.e., even an attacker is connected to smartphone, it will not be
able to retrieve the Wi-Fi password if the secrets are unknown.
Unfortunately, the secrets are identical to all the devices,
therefore we can defeat the entire solution by attacking only
one device.
2) Unique Secrets for Every Device: Security will be
enhanced if unique secrets are allocated for every device, as
attacking one device will not help in cracking other devices.
However, we would argue that the cost of unique secrets can
be too high to afford, because IoT devices come in large scale.
Specifically, every device can be assigned a unique key during
manufacturing. The key can be (1) printed on device, or (2)
recorded in a database and indexed by device ID or MAC
address. When the device needs to be authenticated, the printed
key can be directly read by user and inputted in the other party
(e.g., smartphone), or the stored key can be queried from the
database. In case (1), the problem is that the same key should
be stored simultaneously at two places, i.e., hardcoded inside
firmware and printed on device. While manufacturing in large
scale, maintaining a sufficiently low mismatch rate will be a
big challenge to device vendors. In case (2), for symmetric
key, we need additional means for determining which user
can query the key of a device ID. Otherwise, the key will be
leaked to attackers. Private/public key pair might mitigate the
problem, for which each vendor can build an infrastructure
similar to the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [18]. Again, the
maintenance cost will be a big challenge when devices come
in large scale.
3) Encrypting the Channel between Smartphone and IoT
device: Encrypting the channel can prevent eavesdroppers
from capturing the message exchanges. However, while encrypting the channel is not difficult, for example, generating
symmetric key using Diffie-Hellman key exchange or providing private/public key pair from either side, encryption does
not prevent active attackers. In the Wemo case (as well as
many other home automation devices we tried), device sets
itself as Wi-Fi access point for smartphone to connect. As in
Figure 1, an active attacker can impersonate the Wemo device
by broadcasting the same SSID and using the same MAC
address. If smartphone is connected to the attacker, home WiFi password will be sent to the attacker directly.
To conclude the discussions, we argue that IoT device
authentication is practically needed and non-trivial to fulfill,
IoT-specific mechanism is desired.
B. Related Authentication Problems and Solutions
In this subsection, we discuss related authentication problems and mechanisms in literatures and in practice. We use the
discussion to motivate the new design proposed in this paper.
The most related problem is authenticating some other embedded devices, such as Wi-Fi router, wireless display adapter,
embedded wearable (bluetooth earphone), etc. Different from
IoT devices which lack user interface, Wi-Fi router and wireless display adapter actually contain display. For example, user
can assign arbitrary password to Wi-Fi router by connecting it
to a laptop through Ethernet port. Wireless display adapter is
by default connected to a display, therefore the same device
key pre-assigned in firmware can be shown on display (instead
of printed on device). Similar to IoT devices, Bluetooth
earphone does not contain display, therefore the same security
problem also exists. In particular, convenient mechanism like
pushing button simultaneously on both sides does not prevent
active impersonating attack [19]. Therefore, in practice PSK
is used. But for the sake of convenience, usually an identical
pin is used for all device, such as “0000”, which completely
defeats the purpose of PSK. However, we would notice that
the same security problem on embedded wearables does not
raise as much as the concerns on IoT devices, because active
attack on wearable device is more difficult to play as device
association can happen anywhere (together with the user),
while IoT devices are usually operating in fixed locations (e.g.,
home appliances).
Mobile device pairing (e.g., two smartphones) is also similar
to our problem, except that IoT devices are usually difficult
to move and do not equip popular sensors. Therefore, mechanisms using sensors on both side do not apply, such as biometric [20], accelerometer and gyroscope [4], [5], microphone [9],
etc. Moreover, mechanisms using explicit out-of-band channel
also do not apply, such as infrared [6], touch [7], visible
light [8], etc.
Sensor network devices are also a type of embedded devices
therefore are related. However, we would argue that, unlike
IoT devices which will be connected to unknown access point,
sensor network devices are usually designed for specific applications, e.g., ocean or wildlife monitoring, and manufactured
in batch [21]. Therefore, identical PSK can be distributed into
a set of sensor network devices during manufacturing.
Proximity based mechanisms using radio interface [4], [22]–
[25] are closely related to our proposed solution in this paper.
Normalized Rss(dB)
15
-10
-20
-30
-40
-50
0
(a) Antenna emits polarized radio wave
6
(b) Deep fading in theory
Fig. 4. Antenna polarization primer. (a) The physics behind antenna polarization is radio wave polarization. Radio antenna (e.g., dipole) essentially
emits polarized radio wave. (b) Deep fading exists in certain antenna angle
accroding to the Malus’s law.
We divided them into two types: passive and active. In passive
solutions [22], [23], two nearby devices determine the proximity by common ambient radio environment. However, they
require rich variation of ambient signal to provide sufficient
information for reliable proximity detection, which is nontrivial to fulfil in practice. To enrich the information, they
may require shaking device together, or equipping customized
radio to sense additional signal like FM and TV [23], which
are not prefered in our problem. Moreover, they may require a
sufficiently short distance between two devices, e.g., few centermeters on Wi-Fi frequency. On the other hand, in active solutions, Castelluccia [4] requires two devices to shake together
to confuse eavesdroppers, therefore does not apply to our
problem. Cai [24] and Pierson [25] rely on multiple antennas
to detect the proximity by the large signal-strength difference.
They actually partially inspired our solution. However, our solution differs in various ways. (1) Instead of multiple-antenna,
we propose hand-gesture to create signal-strength difference,
therefore our solution can be applied to smartphones which
usually contain single antenna. (2) In our design, we not only
use the event of large signal-strength difference, but also take
advantage of the correlation between device movement and
signal-strength variation, therefore can reliably protect against
powerful active attacker. (3) In addition to distance, we also
explore device angle (because of antenna polarization) which
also provides large signal-strength difference in proximity.
III. P ROXIMITY D ETECTION BASED ON RSS VARIATION
In this paper, we propose a Received Signal Strength (RSS)
based scheme for proximity detection on single antenna devices. The basic idea is that when two devices are in proximity,
small device movement can cause significant RSS-variation.
Specifically, we explored two types of movement which both
lead to around 15dB RSS-variation, i.e., moving towards and
away from each other, and rotating, as shown in Figure 2.
The large RSS-variation upon moving towards and away
are caused by the fast-changing channel attenuation when
two devices are in proximity. While it has been introduced
before [24], [25], in the following, we focus on introducing
antenna polarization which leads to large RSS-variation upon
(relative) rotating when two devices are in proximity.
Far Away
10
In Proximity
5
0
−5
−10
−15
2
4
Antenna angle (radian)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Time(s)
15
Normalized Rss(dB)
Antenna gain (dB)
0
10
Far Away
In Proximity
1
1.5
5
0
−5
−10
−15
0
0.5
Time(s)
Fig. 5. Smartphone movement caused RSS-variation under sender-inproximity vs. sender-far-awary. Sender-in-proximity can lead to more than
15dB RSS-variation while sender-far-away only leads to 5dB RSS-variation
due to small-scale fading. Upper: moving towards and away. Bottom: Rotating.
A. Antenna Polarization
The key idea of Move2Auth is leveraging antenna polarization to generate deep fading events in near field, which is also
undetectable in far field. In this section, we provide a brief
introduction for antenna polarization.
The physics behind antenna polarization is radio wave
polarization [26]. Radio antenna essentially emits polarized
radio wave. Figure 4(a) shows an illustrative example using
dipole antenna which is the most popular antenna type in
today’s radio devices. As shown in the figure, the electric field
always oscillates along antenna direction because it is the only
possible direction for the electrons inside antenna to move.
Antenna polarization causes a phenomenon that RSS
changes with the angle between transmitting (TX) antenna and
receiving (RX) antenna. The relationship is described by the
Malus’ law [27] as follows.
Gθ = G0 cos2 θ
(1)
where θ is the angle between TX antenna and RX antenna,
Gθ is the antenna gain with angle θ, and G0 is the maximum
antenna gain achieved when TX and RX antennas are parallel.
Figure 4(b) shows simulation results with various θ. When TX
and RX antenna are perpendicular to each other, antenna gain
will be zero which we call it deep fading. Therefore, when we
rotate one of the devices, we will observe large RSS variation.
In practice, equation 1 only holds when two devices are in
proximity. The reason is the rich-multipath wireless channel.
A deep fading angle on one path will be overwhelmed by received signal on other paths, because polarization direction of
radio wave changes upon reflection. Moreover, scattering and
diffraction, which is also rich in microwave bands (e.g., WiFi, cellular, bluetooth, Zigbee, etc.) because of the comparable
wavelength with many objects [28], further make deep fading
unobservable in longer distance.
B. RSS-Variation in Practice
Figure 5 shows examples of RSS-trace when sender is inproximity or far-away, where the far-away sender is placed in
a neighbor room of the receiver (smartphone). The upper subfigure shows RSS-traces while user moves smartphone towards
and away from sender. When sender is in-proximity, the fastchanging attenuation leads to more than 15dB RSS-variation.
The bottom sub-figure shows RSS-traces when user rotates
smartphone. When sender is in-proximity, antenna polarization
leads to around 15dB RSS-variation. We notice that the RSStrace appears different from Figure 4 because smartphone
is rotated only 90° around the deep fading angle. Finally,
RSS-variation from far-away sender is usually much smaller
(around 5dB) and mainly caused by small-scale fading [28].
IV. M OVE 2 AUTH D ESIGN
In this section, we elaborate the design of Move2Auth which
provides a novel mechanism for IoT device authentication.
While the design can be easily extended to other radio
technologies, we introduce in the context of Wi-Fi.
packets with significantly-varying RSS, as the reasons shown
in section III.
Smartphone determines whether the packets are sent from
a nearby device based on two criteria, i.e., (1) RSS-variation
exceeds a threshold, (2) RSS-trace matches with smartphone
sensor trace. In our design, we set 10dB as the RSS-variation
threshold for both gestures.
Matching between RSS-trace and sensor-trace is an important building block of Move2Auth. The idea behind tracematching is that, both traces can precisely describe smartphone
movement when two devices are in proximity, but when two
devices are far-apart, RSS-trace will not reflect the movement
well. In our design, we not only consider shape of traces, but
also involve timing for trace-matching. Timing information
creates big-barrier for attacker who can fake large RSSvariation (e.g., by tuning its transmission power). Even if the
faked RSS-variation reflects the pace of smartphone-movement
well, the faked RSS trace will not exactly match smartphonemovement because of their different start time. In our design,
both sensor-trace and RSS-trace are recorded on smartphone
so that we can easily synchronize them using smartphone
clock. In section IV-C and IV-D, we will discuss how we
transform one of the traces to perform trace-matching.
A. Goal and Threat Model
Our goal is to build a device-authentication mechanism for
the purpose of facilitating IoT device to securely associate
to Wi-Fi router. In particular, we leverage smartphone in
the way that connecting IoT device to smartphone first, and
input the password of Wi-Fi router on smartphone, as we
discussioned in the Introduction and Figure 1. As a result,
the whole process can be considered secure as long as the
IoT-smartphone connection is secure.
We consider attacker who can receive the packets from
IoT device and smartphone, but is not physically close to
IoT device, e.g., outside of the home as in home automation
scenario. We consider powerful attackers. For example, the
attacker can sniff all the Wi-Fi channels and capture all the
packets; he may have arbitrarily high-sensitivity receiver; he
can actively connect to smartphone by impersonating the IoT
device; he may have arbitrarily high transmission power and
can adjust the transmission power arbitrarily; he may have full
knowledge of our scheme; he may have exact copy of the IoT
device; he may know the exact location of the IoT device.
In the following, we focus on one-way authentication, i.e.,
smartphone authenticates IoT device. The other way, i.e.,
IoT device authenticates smartphone, is not necessary in our
problem, as we will discuss in section IV-I.
C. Trace Transformation – Moving Towards and Away
We require user to move smartphone for around 20cm,
and the shortest distance to IoT device is around 20cm. This
smartphone movement causes around 15dB RSS-variation.
In our design, moving smartphone towards and away from
IoT device is captured by accelerometer. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume smartphone moves strictly on a line
(towards IoT device). Therefore, the accelerometer-reading can
be reduced from 3-dimension to 1-dimension.
Since converting acceleration into distance (by integration)
will introduce accumulative error, we choose to transform
RSS-trace into accelerometer-trace. Specifically, we first convert RSS-trace into distance-trace as described in [24], then we
convert distance into acceleration by performing differenceoperation for two times, i.e., from distance to speed, then to
acceleration. In order to avoid parameter-setting, e.g., absolute
distance to IoT device, we normalize both converted trace and
real accelerometer trace into the same scale, e.g., [0,1].
Finally, we synchronize two traces and calculate correlation.
We determine whether two traces match with each other using
a threshold on correlation result. We will discuss threshold
setting in section VI.
B. Basic Scheme
We assume IoT device is not moveable. When an IoT
device is in pairing mode, it keeps sending encrypted packets
(section IV-G). On the mean time, we require user to hold
smartphone in front of (e.g., 20cm distance) the IoT device and
perform small gesture for a while (e.g., three seconds). User
will be asked to perform one of two gestures, i.e., moving
towards and away from IoT device and rotating, as shown
in Figure 2. The gesture is randomly picked by smartphone.
While the gesture is performed, smartphone receives a series of
D. Trace Transformation – Rotating
We require user to rotate smartphone for around 180°, so
that RSS deep fading caused by antenna polarization will be
reliably captured which provides around 12dB RSS-variation.
In our design, rotation is captured by gyroscope. As discussed in section III and in Figure 4, rotation causes deepfading in RSS-trace because of antenna polarization. However, on the rest of RSS-trace, RSS is relatively flat. As a
consequence, we will not be able to capture the turns (i.e.,
from clockwise to counter-clockwise, and vice versa) from
1
Far Away
In Proximity
Correlation
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0
1
2
3
4
Time(s)
Fig. 6. Correlation results for trace-matching based on smartphone rotation.
Three-second gesture clearly differentiates sender-in-proximity and senderfar-away. We notice that RSS-variation will further enhancing differentiation.
RSS-trace. Therefore, we choose to transform gyroscope-trace
into RSS-trace, i.e., we first reduce gyroscope-reading from
3-dimension to 1-dimension, then we derive RSS-trace using
Equation 1.
Moreover, in order to provide better usability, we do not
make assumption on IoT device’s antenna angle, e.g., vertical,
horizontal, etc. Instead, from gyroscope-trace we try all possible angles and derive RSS-trace accordingly. We calculate
correlation between all the derived RSS-traces and the real
RSS-trace (after normalization), and choose the maximum as
correlation result. According to our experiments, our design
choice still provides sufficiently-low false-positive rate, as we
will discuss in section VI.
E. Duration of User Gesture
In our current design, we require user to push a (virtual)
button on smartphone to start the user gesture.
We derive proper duration of user gesture from experiment
results. In Figure 6 we show the correlation results of tracematching based on smartphone rotation. We calculate correlation from part of the trace (# of seconds from starting point).
Error bar shows the deviation on 50 traces. When the traces
are longer than three seconds, correlation result can clearly
differentiate sender-in-proximity and sender-far-away. We also
notice that RSS-variation will further enhance the differentiation. And rotating already represents high correlation results
for sender-far-away, as we have discussed in section IV-D.
As a result, in Move2Auth we require user to perform a
gesture for at least three seconds. Every sensor trace is also
cut to three-second before trace-matching.
F. Dealing with RSS Inaccuracy
A practical problem for our scheme is RSS Saturation that
RSS will saturate to a value (e.g., −10dBm on our platform)
when transmitter is very close (e.g., 20cm). Therefore, we
require the IoT device to transmit in a lower power-level.
According to our experience, 20dB lower transmission power
is sufficient to avoid RSS saturation, which is easy to realize
on commodity Wi-Fi chipsets.
Another problem is that RSS reading will be inconsistent
with different data rates (more specifically, different packet
preambles [24]). Therefore, we require IoT device to use the
basic rate (i.e., 6M bps) during authentication.
G. Encryption
Besides the authentication scheme we described above, we
also need to encrypt the communication channel between
smartphone and IoT device to protect against eavesdropping.
[29], [30] provide approaches to derive a shared key from
characteristics of the wireless channel.
Alternatively, we could use cryptographic techniques to
derive a shared secret. We notice that key generation does
not affect the authentication scheme, because authentication
only measures RSS from the preamble of each packet while
key generation uses the payload of the packet.
We propose a straightforward key generation protocol,
where IoT device sends a public key to smartphone at the
beginning. Then IoT device sends a series of identical packets encrypted by the corresponding private key (to facilitate
authentication). The packet content contains smartphone’s information, e.g., MAC address. Upon successful authentication,
smartphone verify the received public key by decrypting the
packets. Finally, smartphone generates a random shared key
and sends it to the authenticated IoT device in a packet
encrypted by the verified public key.
H. Move2Auth Protocol
Our final protocol integrates both device authentication and
key generation, as described below.
1) User triggers pairing mode by pressing a button on
the IoT device for three seconds. IoT device clears its
states in pairing mode, and sets itself as access point for
smartphone to connect.
2) User finds IoT device’s Wi-Fi network by SSID, and
connect smartphone to the IoT device.
3) Upon receiving the connection from smartphone, IoT
device sends a random public key and a series of identical
packets encrypted by the corresponding private key.
4) Smartphone determines whether the IoT device is in
proximity by both checking the strength of RSS-variation
and matching its sensor trace with RSS trace, as described
in section IV-C and IV-D.
5) Upon successful authentication by determining the IoT
device is in proximity, smartphone verifies the public key
by decrypting the packets and checking packet contents.
6) Upon successful decryption and content checking, smartphone encrypts a random shared session key using the
verified public key and sends to IoT device.
7) Finally, a secure communication channel is established
with the shared session key. User can perform IoT-torouter association on smartphone with this secure communication channel.
8) If one the above steps fails, user should re-trigger pairing
mode, as we will explain in section IV-I.
I. Security Analysis
In this subsection, we briefly analyze the security of
Move2Auth by considering various attacks.
1) Eavesdropping: As long as the public/private key cryptography is not defeated, an attacker will not obtain any
information from sniffing the packet transmissions.
2) Impersonating IoT device: During smartphone-IoT pairing, an attacker may impersonate the IoT device by broadcasting the same SSID/MAC-address and using higher transmission power. Smartphone could be connected to the attacker
instead of IoT device because of the higher signal strength.
In Move2Auth, we protect against this attack by checking
whether the connected device is in proximity. Specifically, we
consider an attacker who follows the protocol in section IV-H
to send a series of packets. We discuss two cases. First,
if the attacker does not tune its transmission power. RSSvariation (caused by smartphone movement) will be small and
mismatch with sensor trace. The sender will be determined
not in proximity and authentication will fail. Second, if the
attacker tunes its transmission power to create high RSSvariation, we will mainly rely on trace-matching to detect
proximity. Our experiments show that the trace-matching leads
extremely-low false-positive rate because we consider both the
shape of traces and their exact timing. We will present details
in section VI.
3) Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack: DoS attacks can be
performed in various ways. For example, jamming the wireless
channel to breach the communications. In Move2Auth, we
do not explicitly protect against DoS attack. However, we
believe DoS attack will unlikely cause serious troubles which
are difficult to deal. For example, we will be able to locate
the attacker with the help of pinpointing tool and remove it.
4) The other direction – Should IoT device authenticate
smartphone?: We explain why authentication in the other
direction is not necessary in our problem. Firstly, an alreadyconnected IoT device (with either router or smartphone) will
not enter pairing mode unless user triggers. Secondly, on
IoT-router link, a rogue AP may send dis-associate packet
to break the link and cheat IoT device to connect to it (by
impersonating the router). We can protect against this attack
by requiring IoT device to always perform PSK-based secure
association, because IoT device will also authenticate router in
this way. Thirdly, during smartphone-IoT pairing, an attacker
may successfully connect to the IoT device. In order to avoid
any harm on this temporary illegitimate connection, we require
IoT device to only accept one connection in pairing mode. In
this way, this attacker-IoT connection will be easily detected
if smartphone fails to connect to IoT device. And user should
re-trigger pairing mode by pressing the IoT device button.
Moreover, in pairing mode, IoT device should clear all its
states and data. Therefore, nothing will be leaked to attacker
on the temporary attacker-IoT connection. Finally, given the
short attacker-IoT connection time, we assume attacker will
not be able to completely compromise the IoT device and turn
it into a “zombie” (e.g., by pushing a fake firmware update).
J. Discussion
1) Usability: Since the two gestures in Move2Auth are
both straightforward, in our current design, we require user to
perform the gesture strictly, e.g., moving on the line towards
IoT device, or rotating in a plane which is perpendicular to
the line between smartphone and IoT device. In theory, we
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3
5
9
6
10
7
11
8
12
1
4
Fig. 7. We tested 12 locations, where we assume user and smartphone are at
location 1 as shown in the figure. Most locations are within the same room
but only contain non-line-of-sign paths to smartphone.
can perform sophisticated gesture recognition and remove the
requirements. We take this as our future work.
2) Requirement on Computation: Taking Wemo as an example, it equips a 320M Hz MIPS processor which is capable
to call openssl libraries and run in real-time. We believe the
computation of public/private key cryptography also can be
fulfilled on many other today’s IoT devices. On smartphone
side, similar computation is easy to fulfill as smartphone has
become very powerful today.
3) Antenna types: Most antennas today are dipole which
generates linearly-polarized radio wave as shown in Figure 4.
Many other antenna types also emit polarized radio wave such
as patch antenna. According to our experience on smartphones
and IoT devices, e.g., iPhone, Samsung Galaxy, Wemo devices,
etc., antenna polarization holds on all these devices.
4) Other IoT security issues: We notice that there are other
security problems reported for IoT devices [2]. For example, a
home automation device could be accessed and controlled remotely. We believe these problems call for additional security
mechanisms. However, these are out of scope of this paper.
V. I MPLEMENTATION
We implemented a prototype of Move2Auth on Android
smartphone and commodity Wi-Fi adapter. We tried Atheros
and Intel Wi-Fi adapters on Linux PC to act as IoT device.
We successfully decreased transmission power and fixed data
rate on both Wi-Fi chipsets to fulfill Move2Auth. In order to
obtain RSS on smartphone, we installed a customized Wi-Fi
driver which can turn smartphone Wi-Fi into monitor mode.
Currently, the driver only works on Samsung Galaxy 2 and 3.
In Move2Auth, we record accelerometer and gyroscope output
upon a (virtual) button press, as discussed in section IV-E.
We added timestamp to RSS trace and sensor trace to faciliate
trace-matching. To implement public/private key cryptogrophy,
we called the openssl library. In our current implementation of
Move2Auth, we programmed IoT device (Linux PC) to send
packets every 1ms, i.e., 1000Hz RSS sampling rate.
VI. E VALUATION
In this section, we present our evaluation for Move2Auth.
We focus on reliability of proximity detection and consider two
cases which may cause false-positive detection, i.e., another
far-away IoT device which is also in pairing mode and an
active attacker who can arbitrarily tune transmission power.
We present two cases in section VI-B and VI-C, respectively.
We set up a testbed as shown in Figure 7, where we tested
12 IoT device locations inside and outside an office room
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Location Index
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Correlation
RSS Variation
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RSS Variation (dB)
Correlation
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Correlation
RSS Variation
RSS Variation (dB)
1
0.8
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1
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3
4
5
6
7
8
Location Index
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10
11
12
Fig. 8. Correlation and RSS-variation at 12 locations. We present average and error bar (maximum and minimum) from all the tests conducted at a location.
User and smartphone is fixed to location 1, so location 1 represents in-proximity case. Left: gesture moving towards and away; Right: gesture rotating.
(10m × 8m). We fixed user’s location (and smartphone) to
locaion 1, as shown in the figure. We moved the IoT device
to each of 12 locations, then perform both gestures to collect
RSS-trace and sensor-trace. We also invited five users for the
tests. Among them, two users performed tests for all the IoT
device locations, rest of the users (three) only performed tests
at location 1 and 12. We tested two gestures separately and
repeat all the tests with both gestures. For each test, we repeat
10 times and present statistics. Collectively, we get 600 sensortraces and RSS-traces in total.
In all the experiment, the threshold for RSS-variation is
10dB, and threshold for correlation (trace-matching) is 0.6.
A. Detection Rate In Proximity
We first study successful-detection rate when smartphone
and IoT device are in proximity. Figure 8 shows the statistic
for all the tests on a location, where we also mix tests from
different users. Two sub-figures represent two gestures. At
location 1, both correlation and RSS-variation are clearly
higher than other locations. Since all the correlation and RSSvariation at location 1 (50 for each gesture) exceed thresold,
proximity detection was always successful in the tests i.e.,
false-negative rate is zero.
B. Reliability against Another Far-Away IoT Device
Then, we consider the case that another far-away IoT device
is also in pairing mode. In this way, we study the false
detection rate that smartphone actually authenticate a far-away
IoT device. Location 2 ∼ 12 represents far-away IoT device
locations. As shown in Figure 8, at location 2 ∼ 12, falsepositive rate is zero because correlation and RSS-variation
never exceeds the thresholds simultaneously. Actually, usually
neither of them exceeds threshold.
Comparing two gestures, we found rotating leads to higher
correlation results. This is expected result as we have explained
in section IV-D. However, rotating also leads relatively lower
RSS-variation. Therefore, both gestures can perform well in
the case of far-away IoT device.
C. Reliability against Active Attacker
Then, we consider an active attacker who can arbitrarily
tune transmission power. In this case, RSS-variation threshold
will be eaily defeated. Therefore, we only consider correlation
(trace-mapping). Although we conducted the tests for both
gestures, due to page limit, we only present the results
from rotating gesture. As we have mentioned above, rotating
represents the more challenging case because the correlation
tends to be high (explained in section IV-D).
We consider four types of RSS wave that attacker can create.
The first one is sine wave where we assume attacker has
no knowledge of user’s gesture. Specifically, attacker may try
different frequency of sine wave. In the tests, we tried 16
frequencies uniformly distributed from 0.5Hz to 4Hz. We
assume attacker transmit the RSS wave continuously. The
tests was conducted by setting different starting time for a
real gesture (sensor trace), and we performed trace-matching
between sensor-trace and sine RSS wave (i.e., calculating
correlation). We notice that we actually assume the RSSvariation caused by gesture is much smaller than the RSS
wave created by attacker. We plot the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of correlation results on left-top of Figure 9.
With correlation threshold of 0.6, the false-positive is 0.27%.
The second one is RSS wave derived from gesture of
another user, e.g., attacker himself. Specifically, we collect the
RSS-traces from all five users when they are at location 1 (inproximity). We calculate correlation between all combination
of different users. Also, we include different trace start time.
Right-top of Figure 9 shows the CDF of the correlation result
for this case. The false-positive rate is 0.31%. It is interesting
to see that gesture information from different user actually
does not help in the attack, because different user usually
perform gestures in different pace, speed and extent, even the
gesture is as simple as rotating.
The third one is historical RSS wave recorded from the
same user. Specifically, we collect all the RSS traces from the
same user at location 1 (in proximity). We calculate correlation
between all combination of different traces from the same
user. We also include different trace start time. Left-bottom of
Figure 9 shows the CDF of the correlation result in this case.
The false-positive rate is 0.28%. It is also interesting to see
that the historical information from the same user actually does
not help a lot, because the details differ when a user perform
a gesture again. We believe this difference is more significant
with simple gestures like rotating, but for complicated gestures
like writing a signature would be more consistent.
Finally, we consider a non-real case that attacker knows
user’s gesture in advance. Specifically, we calculate the exactly
same trace but consider different trace starting time. As shown
in right-bottom of Figure 9, the false-positive rate increases,
but is still as small as 8.2%. We notice that the timing
information plays important role in trace-matching, which can
CDF
1
0.8
CDF
CDF
CDF
[4] R. Mayrhofer and H. Gellersen, “Shake well before use: Intuitive
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[6] D. Balfanz, D. K. Smetters, P. Stewart, and H. C. Wong, “Talking
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to strangers: Authentication in ad-hoc wireless networks.” in NDSS,
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[7] D. G. Park, J. K. Kim, J. B. Sung, J. H. Hwang, C. H. Hyung, and
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S. W. Kang, “Tap: touch-and-play,” in Proceedings of the SIGCHI
conference on Human Factors in computing systems.
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N. Saxena, J.-E. Ekberg, K. Kostiainen, and N. Asokan, “Secure
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audio,” Mobile Computing, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 12, no. 2.
Fig. 9. CDF of correlation (trace-matching) results between sensor trace and
[10] E. Fernandes, J. Jung, and A. Prakash, “Security Analysis of
RSS-variation created by attacker. Left top: attacker sending sine RSS wave
Emerging Smart Home Applications,” in Proceedings of the 37th
with different frequencies from 0.5Hz to 4Hz, false-positive rate is 0.27%.
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 2016.
Right top: attacker sending RSS wave recorded from other user’s gesture
(e.g., attacker’s), false-positive rate is 0.31%. Left bottom: attacker obtained [11] “Owners of heatmiser wifi thermostats warned
of password leaks and other vulnerabilities,”
RSS wave recorded from user’s previous gesture, false-positive rate is 0.28%.
https://www.grahamcluley.com/2014/09/heatmiser-wifi-thermostatsRight bottom: attacker knows what gesture the user will perform, practically
password-leak/.
infeasible, false-positive rate is 8.2%.
prevent even the (non-real) most strongest attacker. However, [12] “Kettles are leaking wifi passwords (and other failures of the internet
of things),” http://www.newstatesman.com/science-tech/futurethis attack itself will not happen in practice.
proof/2015/10/kettles-are-leaking-wifi-passwords-and-other-failuresinternet.
To conclude our evaluation, Move2Auth provides reliable
proximity detection with zero false-negative rate in our tests. [13] “Belkin wemo home automation,”
http://www.belkin.com/us/Products/home-automation/c/wemoMove2Auth effectively prevents smartphone to authenticate a
home-automation/.
far-away IoT device, the false-positive rate is also zero in [14] “Base64,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Base64.
our tests. Move2Auth also effectively protect against strong [15] “Binwalk firmware analysis tool,” http://binwalk.org/.
[16] “Ida disassembler and debugger,” https://www.hex-rays.com/.
attacker that can arbitrarily tune transmission power, the false- [17] “Openssl libraries,” https://www.openssl.org/.
positive rate is consistently lower than 0.5% in practical cases. [18] “Public key infrastructure,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public key
infrastructure.
VII. C ONCLUSION
[19]
“How does wi-fi protected setup work?” http://www.wi-fi.org/discoverMotivated by our observation of IoT security vulnerawi-fi/wi-fi-protected-setup.
bility in real world, we propose a novel proximity based [20] I. Buhan, B. Boom, J. Doumen, P. H. Hartel, and R. N. Veldhuis,
“Secure pairing with biometrics,” International Journal of Security
authentication mechanism for IoT devices called Move2Auth.
and Networks, vol. 4, no. 1-2, pp. 27–42, 2009.
Move2Auth detects proximity by checking (1) large RSS[21] A. Perrig, J. Stankovic, and D. Wagner, “Security in wireless sensor
variation and (2) matching between RSS-trace and smartphone
networks,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 47, no. 6.
sensor-trace during two user gestures, i.e., moving smartphone [22] A. Varshavsky, A. Scannell, A. LaMarca, and E. De Lara, Amigo:
Proximity-based authentication of mobile devices. Springer, 2007.
toward or away from IoT device, and rotating smartphone. We
[23] S. Mathur, R. Miller, A. Varshavsky, W. Trappe, and N. Mandayam,
implement Move2Auth on Samsung smartphone and prove its
“Proximate: proximity-based secure pairing using ambient wireless
signals,” in Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Mobile
reliability against powerful active attacker.
systems, applications, and services. ACM, 2011, pp. 211–224.
We believe our study will help in building secure infras[24] L. Cai, K. Zeng, H. Chen, and P. Mohapatra, “Good neighbor:
tructure for the coming IoT era.
Secure pairing of nearby wireless devices by multiple antennas,”
in Proceedings of the 18th Annual Network and Distributed System
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Security Symposium, 2011.
The research was supported in part by grants from
T. J. Pierson, X. Liang, R. Peterson, and D. Kotz, “Wanda: securely
973 project 2013CB329006, RGC under the contracts [25] introducing
mobile devices.” InfoCom, 2016.
CERG
M-HKUST609/13,
622613,
16212714,
and [26] “Polarization (waves),” https
:
//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P olarization(waves).
16203215,ITS/143/14FP-A, as well as the grant from
[27] Z. Yang, Z. Wang, J. Zhang, C. Huang, and Q. Zhang, “Wearables
Huawei-HKUST joint lab, IoT WiFi key technologies.
can afford: Light-weight indoor positioning with visible light,” in
R EFERENCES
Proceedings of the 13th Annual International Conference on Mobile
Systems, Applications, and Services, ser. MobiSys ’15, 2015.
[1] “Gartner says 6.4 billion connected “things” will
[28] P. V. David Tse, “Fundamentals of wireless communications,” 2004.
be in use in 2016, up 30 percent from 2015,”
[29] S. Jana, S. N. Premnath, M. Clark, S. K. Kasera, N. Patwari, and
http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3165317.
S. V. Krishnamurthy, “On the effectiveness of secret key extraction
[2] T. Yu, V. Sekar, S. Seshan, Y. Agarwal, and C. Xu, “Handling a
from wireless signal strength in real environments,” in Proceedings of
trillion (unfixable) flaws on a billion devices: Rethinking network
the 15th annual international conference on Mobile computing and
security for the internet-of-things,” in Proceedings of the 14th ACM
networking. ACM, 2009, pp. 321–332.
Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks. ACM, 2015, p. 5.
[30] S. Mathur, W. Trappe, N. Mandayam, C. Ye, and A. Reznik, “Radio[3] D. Harkins, “Simultaneous authentication of equals: A secure,
telepathy: extracting a secret key from an unauthenticated wireless
password-based key exchange for mesh networks,” in Proceedings
channel,” in Proceedings of the 14th ACM international conference on
of the 2008 Second International Conference on Sensor Technologies
Mobile computing and networking. ACM, 2008, pp. 128–139.
and Applications, ser. SENSORCOMM ’08, 2008, pp. 839–844.
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CEG 7470 Advanced Computer Networks
REVIEW GUIDELINES
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that was distributed in class.
GENERAL
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Are key terms defined? If not, which definitions are omitted or inadequate?
Is the paper well written? Is the use of English correct, clear and concise? What about spelling?
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missing? How can the paper be improved?
What future work does the paper suggest or imply?
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2.
3.
Are theorems/lemmas clearly stated?
Are proofs correct and complete?
Do the theorems and proofs justify the author’s claims?
SIMULATION RESULTS
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3.
4.
Is the system being simulated adequately described?
Are simulations described in such a way that it would be possible to repeat the experiment? In
particular, are the parameters, their range of values and their relationships to each other clearly
described? Are any key (to evaluating the correctness and impact of the simulation) parameters,
their values or relationships to other parameters not clearly specified?
Are simulation results presented clearly and is this done for a useful range of values?
Do you believe that the simulation adequately support the author’s claims? If not, why?
EXPERIMENTATION
1.
2.
3.
Did the author implement all or part of the system discussed?
Is the implementation interesting in its own right and, if so, why?
Are performance results of experiments reported and, if so, do the results provide evidence for the
author’s claims?
REVIEW FORMAT
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